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EMPTY PROTECTION AND MEANINGLESS 
REVIEW—THE NEED TO REFORM 
CALIFORNIA’S STAGNANT 
CAPITAL CLEMENCY SYSTEM 
Brittney Cunningham* 
This Note examines California’s stagnant capital clemency system and 
its ability to properly function as a fail safe against miscarriages of 
justice. Finding that the state’s clemency system lacks transparency, 
appears arbitrary, and is strained by political pressure, this Note 
argues that California’s system of wide discretion fails to provide a 
meaningful review of clemency petitions. To restore clemency’s fail-
safe function, this Note urges California to create a clemency board 
and provide procedural guidelines for the board to follow when 
addressing petitions. This Note asserts that by enacting these reforms, 
California will invigorate its stagnant clemency system and ensure that 
clemency petitions are meaningfully reviewed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the historical aims of clemency is to protect against 
miscarriages of justice.1 In fact, in Herrera v. Collins,2 the Supreme 
Court relied on clemency as a “fail safe” in the criminal justice 
system when it denied review of a death row inmate’s newly 
discovered evidence of actual innocence.3 In rationalizing its 
decision, the Court explained that the state clemency system would 
prevent an innocent man’s execution.4 By placing its confidence in 
clemency, the Court recognized the process as a “critical component 
in the death penalty system”5 while reaffirming its utility in 
preventing injustice.6 
Unfortunately, the Court failed to recognize that many states, 
including the state in which Herrera would seek clemency,7 grant 
their governors unfettered clemency powers. In these states, 
investigation is discretionary, and there is no guarantee that the 
governor will review a petitioner’s exculpating evidence.8 This 
discretionary clemency power, unregulated and largely 
unreviewable, is at odds with the idea that clemency prevents 
injustice and undermines the Herrera Court’s assumption that 
clemency petitioners will receive meaningful review of their 
petitions.9 
California is among the states that place clemency power solely 
in the hands of the governor, who is checked only by the election 
process.10 This system is largely “standardless in procedure, 
discretionary in exercise, and unreviewable in result.”11 Indeed, in 
 
 1.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993). 
 2. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 3. See id. at 411, 415. 
 4. See id. at 411; Alyson Dinsmore, Comment, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to 
Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1825, 1827 (2002). 
 5. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1827. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Herrera would seek clemency in Texas, one of the states that employs executive 
clemency. 
 8. See Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1827 (“[G]overnors are free to do whatever they choose 
at clemency, restrained only by potential political consequences.”). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Jonathan Harris & Lothlórien Redmond, Executive Clemency: The Lethal Absence of 
Hope, 3 CRIM. L. BRIEF 2, 8–9 (2007); Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1827. 
 11. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1827 (quoting Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive 
Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 257 (1990–1991)). 
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exercising clemency powers, the governor decides whether to hold 
hearings, meet with counsel, or consider certain evidence.12 Rather 
than function as a “reliable fail-safe in the death penalty system,” this 
form of clemency seems little more than a meaningless ritual.13 
Under California’s current system, the clemency process lacks 
transparency, appears arbitrary, and is outcome-determinative due to 
the political pressure on governors to deny clemency petitions. These 
problems indicate that the current “system of wide discretion[,] 
unchecked by procedural standards[,] may not be able to properly 
serve its role”14 as a fail safe for miscarriages of justice. 
The protection clemency offers is especially necessary given the 
status of California’s capital punishment system. California has the 
largest death row in the country, with over 700 inmates awaiting 
execution.15 As the increasing death row population turns to 
clemency for post-conviction relief, the procedures used for 
determining whether to grant clemency petitions should fall under 
closer scrutiny.16 
This Note calls for a restoration of clemency’s fail-safe function 
by urging California to create a clemency board and require it to 
follow procedural guidelines when addressing clemency petitions. 
By doing so, the state will ensure that petitioners receive the full 
protections of the clemency process and receive a meaningful review 
of their petitions. 
Part II provides an overview of capital clemency, including its 
historical and modern functions. Part III describes California’s 
clemency process and history in preparation for an analysis of the 
system. Part IV critiques California’s clemency system, identifying 
problems that hinder clemency’s meaningful participation in the 
justice system. Part V identifies why California needs a better 
clemency process, and Part VI recommends changes to improve the 
system. Part VII asserts that now is the right time to effect such 
changes, and Part VIII concludes. 
 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1839. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Daniel Lim, State Due Process Guarantees for Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency 
Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47, 47, 66 (1994). 
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II.  AN OVERVIEW OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY 
Clemency is a general term that encompasses an executive 
decision to issue a pardon, a reprieve, or a commutation.17 A pardon 
essentially “forgives” a crime by absolving an individual’s 
conviction and punishment.18 A reprieve, on the other hand, delays 
the execution of sentence for a short amount of time,19 but does not 
eliminate or reduce the sentence. A commutation substitutes an 
individual’s punishment with a lesser sentence.20 Though clemency 
technically encompasses each function, the term is most commonly 
associated with commutations in capital cases where an inmate’s 
sentence is reduced from death to life imprisonment.21 For the 
purposes of this Note, clemency is examined in this context—when 
the executive commutes the sentence of an individual sentenced to 
death. 
A.  The History of Clemency 
Clemency is a practice deeply rooted in human tradition. It 
originated in the caveman era and remained an important function in 
Biblical and Roman society.22 The English heavily relied on 
clemency and vested kings, as omniscient decision-makers, with 
broad discretion to grant clemency.23 Scholars of the era observed, 
“[T]he King may extend his mercy of what terms he pleases, and 
consequently may annex to his pardon any condition he thinks fit.”24 
After acquiring the American colonies, the King of England 
delegated clemency powers to the colonies’ governors,25 thereby 
exporting this clemency model to the United States. 
After the American colonies gained independence from 
England, citizens were hesitant to grant broad, unrestricted powers to 
a single executive.26 With this wariness in mind, many states issued 
 
 17. Joanna M. Huang, Note, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of 
Clemency, 60 DUKE L.J. 131, 142 (2010). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 2. 
 22. See id. at 3. 
 23. See id.; Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1830. 
 24. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 547 (6th ed. 1824). 
 25. See Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 3. 
 26. Id. 
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clemency powers to the state legislature or to the legislature and the 
governor combined.27 At the federal level, however, the Framers 
eventually placed clemency powers with the President.28 After the 
Constitution was adopted, executive clemency gained popularity, and 
most states, which were free to create their own clemency systems, 
mirrored their provisions after the federal model.29 Accordingly, 
clemency has largely rested in the hands of state governors.30 
Though clemency has primarily remained an executive function 
since its establishment in the United States, its procedures and uses 
have undergone various changes. When examining modern clemency 
procedures, it is important to investigate this ongoing evolution and 
note the ways in which clemency should continue to evolve. 
B.  Modern Clemency and the Tension Between 
Clemency’s Merciful and Fail-Safe Functions 
Today, in several states, clemency powers continue to rest with 
the governor.31 However, since individual states are free to 
implement their own clemency systems, different models have 
emerged over time. There are four models of clemency procedures: 
(1) the governor has sole discretion to decide clemency; (2) the 
governor has sole clemency discretion, but may receive a non-
binding recommendation from a board or advisory group; (3) the 
governor must have a recommendation from a board or advisory 
group to grant clemency; and (4) a board or advisory group has the 
power to determine clemency.32 Of the states that implement the 
death penalty, twenty-one confer clemency authority to the governor, 
acting with or without the advice of a clemency board,33 and eleven 
states confer clemency authority to a board or require the board’s 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction 
Relief and Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 51. 
 29. See Daniel Kobil,The Evolving Role of Clemency in Death Penalty Cases, in AMERICA’S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 673, 675 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ clemency 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (listing types of clemency models in “Clemency Process by State” 
chart). 
 33. See id. Four of the fourteen states that delegate sole clemency discretion to the governor, 
New Jersey, New York, and New Mexico, as well as Illinois, which used an advisory clemency 
board, have now banned the death penalty. Id. 
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consent for the governor to grant clemency.34 California is unique, as 
it is the only state that requires a majority of the state’s supreme 
court to support a governor’s decision to grant clemency to a twice-
convicted felon.35 
Though clemency is part of the judicial system in the sense that 
it is a defendant’s last chance to challenge or plead his case, 
clemency is an executive function that largely remains outside the 
realm of the judicial branch.36 As such, the judicial branch plays a 
minimal role in the clemency process and provides little review of 
clemency procedures or decisions.37 In Ohio Adult Parole Authority 
v. Woodard,38 the Supreme Court acknowledged that minimal due 
process protection exists for clemency petitioners convicted of 
capital crimes.39 Since this opinion, however, clemency petitioners’ 
due process rights have been interpreted very narrowly.40 Thus, 
modern-day clemency is controlled by the executive branch, which is 
essentially checked only by the election process.41 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency in California Capital Cases, 14 
BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2009). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 523 U.S. 272 (1998). 
 39. See id. at 276. In Woodard, a death row inmate claimed Ohio’s clemency procedures 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 277. In a plurality opinion, four 
justices concluded that inmates are not afforded due process rights in clemency proceedings, 
citing clemency as an extrajudicial act of grace. See id. at 275, 285. However, a four-justice 
concurring opinion found that “some minimal procedural safeguards apply in clemency 
proceedings” because a death row inmate maintains an interest in his life. Id. at 288–89 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens supported a 
due process finding, stating that “these proceedings are not entirely exempt from judicial review”, 
id. at 290, and that “it is abundantly clear that respondent possesses a life interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause.” Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
Stevens maintained that “only the most basic elements of fair procedure are required,” id., and 
concluded that “procedures infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or the deliberate 
fabrication of false evidence” violate due process. Id. at 290–91. This agreement between the 
concurring plurality and Justice Stevens appears to pave the way for minimal due process 
protection in clemency proceedings, at least when the petitioner has been sentenced to death. 
 40. For example, in Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840 (N.C. 2001), the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina found no due process violation when the governor deciding clemency was the Attorney 
General at the time the inmate had been sentenced to death. Id. at 849–50. The court stated that 
“minimal due process applicable to state clemency procedures includes the right of an inmate 
seeking clemency to have his or her request reviewed by an executive possessing the level of 
impartiality normally required of a judge presiding over an adjudicatory proceeding.” Id. at 849. 
 41. See Linda E. Carter, Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judicial 
Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 259, 267 (2005) (“[T]he only oversight of clemency rest[s] with voters who elect the 
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Though petitioners are only entitled to a minimal due process 
right in clemency cases, that right places clemency at a unique 
intersection between the judicial and executive branches.42 This 
intersection has led to competing views of clemency: some claim 
clemency is an unregulated executive function, not bound by 
procedural processes,43 while others claim clemency should have 
procedural guidelines similar to judicial hearings.44 These views 
essentially align with clemency’s twin functions. First, clemency 
allows the executive to show mercy by considering factors the 
judicial system did not contemplate.45 Second, clemency acts as a fail 
safe for correcting errors or injustices that have occurred in the 
judicial system.46 Those who support broad executive powers rely on 
clemency’s merciful origins and claim flexibility is needed so that 
executives may consider factors outside the judicial process.47 Those 
who support procedural clemency guidelines cite case law that 
recognizes clemency’s fail-safe function and argue that 
“[c]lemency’s role as a procedural safeguard is in tension with the 
lack of procedural requirements imposed upon it.”48 As the courts 
have recognized both functions of clemency,49 this debate is 
ongoing.50 However, it is important to remember these functions 
when evaluating the systems by which the power is carried out. 
III.  CAPITAL CLEMENCY IN CALIFORNIA 
California’s clemency system stems from the state’s original 
1849 constitution, which granted the governor clemency powers.51 
Since that time, though the constitutional provisions governing 
 
governors.”). 
 42. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 40 (describing clemency’s “unusual placement”). 
 43. Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 11. 
 44. See Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1828. 
 45. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 42. 
 46. Id.; see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993). 
 47. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 97. 
 48. See Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1828. 
 49. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & 
POL. 669, 710 (2001) (describing Justice Marshall and Justice Rehnquist’s belief that clemency is 
an act of executive mercy and the Herrera Court’s reliance on clemency as the “fail safe” of the 
criminal justice system). 
 50. While these functions are prevalent when examining modern clemency systems, the 
debate concerning clemency’s primary function is outside the scope of this Note. 
 51. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13 (1849); Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 43. 
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clemency have changed, the practice remains at the mercy of the 
governor’s unfettered discretion.52 At one time, governors used their 
clemency powers regularly and granted petitions fairly often.53 
Today, however, clemency is little more than a ritual or tradition, an 
atrophied process that pales in comparison to clemency’s previously 
active role in California’s criminal justice system. 
A.  California’s Clemency Procedures 
California’s constitution restricts gubernatorial clemency powers 
very little. In 1879, the California constitution’s clemency provision 
was amended so that a majority of the California Supreme Court had 
to approve clemency before the governor could grant the petition of a 
twice-convicted felon.54 Amendments made to the provision in 1966 
required the governor to report grants of clemency to the 
legislature.55 Aside from the constitution, the governor’s broad 
discretion is subject only to “application procedures” enacted by the 
legislature. Presumably, these procedures merely refer to the 
submission of an inmate’s clemency petition.56 Accordingly, 
“application procedures” are more akin to minimal due process rights 
afforded all clemency petitioners, rather than substantive procedural 
rights such as the right to a hearing.57 
Interestingly, the governor’s powers are more limited in cases 
involving two-time felons. The California Constitution requires 
judicial approval for a governor to grant clemency to a two-time 
felon.58 In these cases, the governor files a public application with the 
California Supreme Court and transmits case documents to the 
court.59 Regardless of the outcome, the chief justice informs the 
governor in writing of the court’s decision, which is made a public 
record.60 
In typical clemency cases, however, there are few, if any, 
 
 52. See infra Part III.A. 
 53. See infra Part III.B. 
 54. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 43–44. 
 55. Id. at 44. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
 59. Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court, 45 
(revised Jan. 1, 2007). 
 60. Id. 
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mandated procedures and no public transparency. All codified 
procedures refer to applying for a petition, while the methods used to 
decide clemency are largely unregulated.61 As such, the governor 
alone makes clemency decisions, as he or she sees fit.62 Given the 
lack of codified procedures and public transparency, it seems 
necessary to analyze this system through the lens of personal 
experience. Indeed, many clemency scholars have relied on their 
own or others’ experiences when conducting studies.63 While this 
experience helps one gain a general understanding of the clemency 
process, it is important to remember that procedures ultimately differ 
for each governor and often for each petition addressed by a single 
governor during his or her term. 
The bulk of the clemency process begins when the execution 
date is set.64 At that point, the governor’s legal affairs secretary sets 
due dates for the clemency application and any opposition.65 The 
petition advances justifications for granting clemency, which often 
include evidence of both innocence and wrongful conviction, as well 
as evidence of mental disability, rehabilitation, and other mitigating 
factors.66 The governor may ask the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) 
to conduct a background investigation of the petitioner at any time 
after receiving the petition.67 Once all judicial processes are final, the 
 
 61. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 44 (stating that the governor’s broad discretion is 
subject only to “application procedures” that most likely refer to the submission of an inmate’s 
clemency petition; id. at 54 (stating that executive clemency procedures are not heavily 
regulated). 
 62. Not all governors were comfortable making these decisions. Reflecting on the clemency 
decisions he made, Governor Edmund Brown stated, 
[T]he longer I live, the larger loom those fifty-nine decisions about justice and mercy 
that I had to make as governor. They didn’t make me feel godlike then: far from it; I 
felt just the opposite. It was an awesome, ultimate power over the lives of others that 
no person or government should have, or crave. And looking back over their names 
and files now, despite the horrible crimes and the catalogue of human weaknesses they 
comprise, I realize that each decision took something out of me that nothing—not 
family or work or hope for the future—has ever been able to replace. 
EDMUND G. BROWN WITH DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE PRIVATE MERCY—A GOVERNOR’S 
EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW 163 (1989). 
 63. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 54 (describing interviews with individuals from 
several administrations that were involved in clemency decisions); see Harris & Redmond, supra 
note 10, at 11 n.103 (drawing on the authors’ personal experience as clemency counsel for 
Stanley Williams). 
 64. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 55. 
 65. Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 9. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 9. 
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BPH collects information from witnesses, the petitioner’s family, the 
victim’s family, and correctional staff.68 
The petitioner may request a hearing in front of the BPH, but 
has no right to be heard.69 Whether a hearing occurs is at the 
governor’s discretion.70 If the governor grants a hearing, BPH 
Commissioners review the petitioner’s application and issue a 
recommendation.71 Hearings are typically public matters, while the 
Commissioners’ recommendation is usually confidential.72 This too 
is subject to the governor’s wishes, as he or she may require a private 
hearing.73 The governor may also set time limits and other 
restrictions on the hearing, including whether the petitioner may be 
present.74 
Following the hearing, if one is held, the governor decides 
whether to take the BHP’s recommendation and whether to make the 
recommendation public.75 If it is kept private, the petitioner, like 
everyone else, remains ignorant of the BPH’s recommendation.76 
Instead of, or in addition to a BPH hearing, the governor may initiate 
his or her own hearing with the district attorney and the petitioner’s 
counsel.77 
Regardless of the process used, the governor retains complete 
discretion at every step of the clemency decision. The governor may 
accept or reject information as he or she sees fit and is not required to 
explain the reasoning or procedures used in reaching the decision.78 
Grants of clemency are reported to the legislature and become public 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 8–9 (“Ultimately, whether to grant clemency is an entirely discretionary decision 
of the California governor, and he or she has broad discretion whether to hold any sort of 
clemency hearing and may consider or ignore any of the information presented to him.”). 
 71. Clemency Policy: California, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY FOUNDATION, 
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/California.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2007). Commissioners, who 
are separate from the BPH investigators, are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the 
senate. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Commissioners may serve 
multiple terms and may only be removed for cause. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 57. 
 72. Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id.; see CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
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records.79 However, clemency denials are merely announced to the 
petitioner and the public in a written statement and, since the 
California Constitution does not require it, are not reported to the 
legislature.80 Therefore, clemency denials are difficult to acquire.81 
B.  Issuing Commutations Was Not Always Rare 
Governors used their clemency power to varying degrees in the 
first half of the twentieth century. For example, while Henry Gage 
granted clemency to only one prisoner during his 1899 to 1902 term, 
William Stephens commuted thirteen prisoners between 1918 and 
1922.82 Edmund Brown, one of the last governors to commute a 
death sentence, granted clemency to twenty prisoners from 1959 to 
1966.83 
While governors granted clemency at different rates, doing so 
was a routine practice. From 1899 to 1967, each governor granted at 
least one clemency petition during his term.84 This changed in 1972, 
however, with a series of cases that halted the death penalty until 
1977.85 In People v. Anderson,86 the California Supreme Court 
overturned the state’s use of the death penalty, ruling that the 
practice violated the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual 
punishment.87 A few months later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Furman v. Georgia,88 which held that the death penalty in Georgia 
and Texas was unconstitutional due to its “arbitrary and capricious” 
application.89 This ruling effectively halted the death penalty systems 
in all fifty states, commuting the sentences of 107 death row inmates 
 
 79. Id. at 9–10. 
 80. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 58. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 45–46. 
 83. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 156 
(Gerald Uelman ed., 2008) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
 84. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 45–46. 
 85. See e.g., History of Capital Punishment, CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & FACILITATION, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/history_of_capital_punishment.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011). 
 86. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
 87. Id. at 899. 
 88. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 89. Id. at 239–40. 
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in California, including Charles Manson and Sirhan Sirhan.90 Later 
that year, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the death penalty itself 
was not unconstitutional so long as it was not applied arbitrarily.91 
After this decision, many states rewrote their death penalty statutes 
in order to satisfy this standard.92 California, one of these states, 
passed a new death penalty statute in 1977 and has retained the 
sentence ever since.93 
Since the Furman decision, clemency grants have drastically 
declined. No commutation has been issued since the death penalty 
was reinstated in California in 1977,94 though thirteen men have been 
executed.95 In fact, Governor Ronald Reagan issued the last grant of 
clemency forty-four years ago.96 
IV.  A CRITIQUE OF CALIFORNIA’S EXISTING CLEMENCY SYSTEM 
In light of clemency’s stagnation, California must examine and 
rework the existing system. Recognizing the need for reform, the 
American Bar Association (ABA), has undertaken projects to 
identify problems with and remedies for the clemency process 
nationwide. The first project, the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission 
(the Kennedy Commission), was created in response to Justice 
Kennedy’s appeal for an examination of the penal system at the 
ABA’s annual meeting in 2003.97 Specifically, Kennedy challenged 
the ABA to examine mandatory sentencing, racial discrimination, 
prison conditions, recidivism, and the state and federal pardoning 
processes.98 The Kennedy Commission examined clemency 
generally, rather than targeting capital cases, but emphasized 
clemency as an important equitable remedy, noting its recent 
 
 90. BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 62. 
 91. See Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 48; History of Capital Punishment, supra note 
85. 
 92. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 48. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See e.g., Clemency, supra note 32 (chart of clemencies granted since 1976 revealing that 
California is not listed as granting any). 
 95. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976, (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 96. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83 at 156. 
 97. AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/leadership/initiative/initiative4.html (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2011). 
 98. Id. 
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atrophy.99 The second ABA project, the Death Penalty Moratorium 
Project (the “Moratorium Project”), specifically examined clemency 
in capital cases.100 In 2007, after evaluating the clemency processes 
of eight sample states,101 the Moratorium Project published its “Key 
Findings,” which emphasized clemency’s importance and made 
recommendations to improve its use and functionality.102 
Interestingly, both projects identified problems that are inescapably 
apparent in California’s clemency system. 
A.  California’s Current Clemency System Lacks Transparency 
As California’s clemency system currently operates, the 
decisionmaking process is shrouded in ambiguity and inconsistency. 
As described above, no mandated procedures exist for deciding 
clemency—the governor dictates the methods used in reaching 
decisions as he or she sees fit. If the governor allows for a BPH or 
personal hearing, that hearing need not be conducted in public. Like 
the majority of the clemency process, the decision to hold a public 
hearing is discretionary.103 Furthermore, clemency denials require no 
written decisions—the governor must only file grants of clemency 
with the state legislature.104 Therefore, since no governor has granted 
clemency in the last forty-four years,105 the procedures used in 
deciding clemency largely remain a mystery to the public. In 
practice, some governors make written statements concerning 
clemency denials, but these statements are difficult to locate since 
there is no requirement that they be recorded.106 
This system has led to a lack of transparency in California’s 
clemency system. The Moratorium Project identified this problem as 
a theme in many jurisdictions, observing that “[m]ost states do not 
 
 99. AM. BAR ASS’N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, Reports with Recommendations to the 
A.B.A. House of Delegates, 71 (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf. 
 100. See ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Project, Key Findings, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/keyfindings_2.authcheckdam.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2011). 
 101. Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. 
 102. See generally ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Project, supra note 100 (assessing the 
fairness and accuracy of eight state death penalty systems). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
 105. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 156. 
 106. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 65–66. 
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require the decision-maker to explain the reasons why clemency was 
or was not granted.”107 The Moratorium Project recommended ending 
this opacity and advocated for more transparency in the clemency 
process.108 
B.  Clemency Decisions Appear Arbitrary 
Perceived arbitrariness goes hand in hand with a lack of 
transparency. Because the investigative measures used, the scope of 
information gathered, and the ability for a petitioner to be heard are 
determined solely by the governor’s wishes, clemency decisions may 
appear arbitrary or predetermined. As such, the governor’s 
“discretion is so broad that it allows, and in fact condones, results 
that are entirely independent of the merits of the case.”109 
Furthermore, the procedures for determining clemency vary for each 
petition addressed within an administration, in addition to the 
variations between gubernatorial administrations.110 For example, 
Governor Edmund Brown looked for “extraordinary reasons” to 
grant clemency, outside guilt or legal issues.111 Alternatively, at least 
in one case, Governor Schwarzenegger considered judicial mistakes 
a key factor in deciding clemency.112 In turn, however, Governor 
Schwarzenegger appeared inconsistent in this requirement—although 
he stated he would deny Stanley Williams’ petition unless a mistake 
had occurred in the judicial system, he made no such requirement for 
previous petitioners.113 These types of inconsistencies indicate an 
arbitrary decision-making process that fails to ensure a principled 
clemency decision. 
 
 107. ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Project, supra note 100, at 4. 
 108. See id. The Moratorium Project recommended implementing procedural and substantive 
standards for the clemency system, as well as public hearings, thus providing for more 
transparency. These recommendations will be discussed in the following section. Infra Part VI.B. 
 109. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1844. 
 110. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 58, 63 (recognizing that “each California 
gubernatorial administration has the flexibility to adopt its own process for review” and that “the 
current administration has implemented a case-by-case approach to the holding of hearings”). 
 111. BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 62, at 10. Governor Brown stated that the governor’s 
clemency powers “had little to do with guilt or innocence, or even with the finer points of law. 
The first was for a jury and the original judge to decide; the second was the job of the appellate 
courts.” Id. 
 112. See Clemency News and Developments: 2005, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency-news-and-developments-2005 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2011). 
 113. See id. 
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In 2008, the California Commission on the Fair Administration 
of Justice flagged this inconsistent clemency process as a topic for 
investigation.114 The commission set forth focus questions 
highlighting these problems: 
• Are clemency procedures used by California governors 
 consistent from one administration to the next? 
• Are they consistent with the procedures utilized by other 
states? 
• Are they adequate to assure a fair opportunity to be heard by 
all  interested parties, and to assure a principled decision on 
the  merits?115 
As the commission suggested, clemency’s ability to ensure a 
meaningful and just review is undermined by the procedural 
inconsistencies of the current process.116 
Perhaps the most compelling example of this problem—albeit a 
noncapital example—is the case of Esteban Nuñez, the son of a 
political ally whose sixteen-year sentence Governor Schwarzenegger 
commuted.117 Nuñez’s case was strikingly similar to that of another 
inmate, Sieu Ngo: both were involved in a group brawl that ended in 
death, though they did not deliver the fatal blow; both were nineteen 
years old when the crime occurred; and both fled hundreds of miles 
after participating in the crime.118 However, Schwarzenegger 
overturned the parole board’s decision to grant Ngo parole, citing 
Ngo’s “irresponsible” flight from the scene of the crime as his reason 
for denying parole.119 Ngo had served sixteen years when 
Schwarzenegger denied his parole; Nuñez had served just seven 
months when Schwarzenegger commuted his sentence.120 As Nuñez’s 
case highlights, California’s discretionary clemency system allows 
for results that do not reflect a fair reasoning on the merits of a case. 
 
 114. Focus Questions for Hearings on the Fair Administration of the Death Penalty in 
California, CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2008), http://ccfaj.org/ 
documents/press/Press22.pdf. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Jack Dolan, Nunez Clemency Is a Departure for Schwarzenegger: The Case Stands in 
Stark Contrast to How He Treated Dozens of Similar Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at 
A1. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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C.  Governors’ Decisions Are Influenced by Political Pressure 
The Kennedy Commission explicitly recognized the impact of 
political pressure on governors deciding clemency petitions.121 In its 
report to the ABA House of Delegates, the commission stated, 
“[T]he vitality of the pardon power in a particular state jurisdiction 
varies depending upon the extent to which its decision-maker is 
insulated from politics.”122 Thus, placing the clemency power with a 
single individual, especially one who is popularly elected and 
politically aligned, undermines clemency’s ability to freely 
function.123 If the governor fears that granting a clemency petition 
will lead to political backlash, he or she may deny the petition.124 
This fear is realistic and ever present. In fact, former Governor 
Edmund Brown admitted denying a petition because he feared a farm 
workers’ minimum-wage bill would be jeopardized if he granted 
clemency.125 The governor was set to hear Richard Lindsey’s 
clemency petition the same week the legislature decided the 
minimum-wage bill.126 Ironically, the swing vote needed to pass the 
bill belonged to a pro–death penalty legislator from the county in 
which the victim was murdered.127 In describing the situation, 
Governor Brown reflected, “[I]f I spared this man’s life, I would 
most certainly be dooming an important farm labor minimum-wage 
bill that we had worked hard to promote.”128 “Should I risk, did I 
even have the right to risk, destroying any of that because of one 
demented criminal?”129 “The scales tipped” in favor of the bill, and 
the governor denied clemency, a decision that troubled him for years 
to come.130 
Similarly, governors may feel pressure to deny clemency 
petitions to avoid appearing “soft on crime.”131 A now-cautionary 
 
 121. See AM. BAR ASSOC. JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99 at 70. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 62, at 72. 
 126. Id. at 75. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 72. 
 129. Id. at 84. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Death Row Clemency Is Much Rarer These Days, ABC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2005), 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/LegalCenter/story?id=1395809. 
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tale, Michael Dukakis’s presidential bid was “killed,” in part,132 after 
he granted a furlough to Willie Horton, who then committed assault, 
robbery, and rape.133 This concern has grown in recent years with the 
emergence and support of the retributive theory of justice.134 Today, 
clemency is viewed by some as a political liability. Scholars 
acknowledge that “[c]lemency can be seen, when it’s exercised by a 
governor, as a sign of weakness or not being tough on one of the 
country’s great social issues.”135 Some governors, afraid of these 
political repercussions, wait until their terms are all but completed to 
grant clemency.136 As a practical matter, however, it appears more 
common for governors to deny clemency petitions than to wait until 
the end of their terms to commute sentences. Instead, “the political 
reality is that there are few criticisms of officials who say ‘no’ to a 
clemency request, and there is considerable risk of political backlash 
if an offender released by action of the executive commits another 
crime.”137 
In addition to this general pressure, California governors 
deciding clemency are indirectly pressured by the California 
Constitution. For the governor to grant clemency to a two-time felon, 
 
 132. Dukakis also lost the presidential election due to his position on the death penalty. Abby 
Livingston, Obama’s Non-Dukakis Answer, FIRST READ FROM NBC NEWS (Jun. 25, 2008, 10:07 
PM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/06/25/4433621-obamas-non-dukakis-answer 
(describing Dukakis’s statements about the death penalty as the “beginning of the end of his 
campaign”). 
 133. See AM. BAR ASS’N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99, at 69; Mark Balzer, 
Shades of 1988, POLITICS (Dec. 5, 2009, 8:57 AM), 
http://www.pocatelloshops.com/new_blogs/politics/?p=5490. Governor Brown also faced 
political backlash for granting clemency, which almost cost him re-election. He stated, 
[B]ecause of my high percentage of commutations, I became known as an outspoken 
foe of capital punishment. It wasn’t an image I consciously tried to create; in fact, the 
evidence is strong that it seriously damaged my political future. Richard Nixon made it 
such a major issue during the 1962 gubernatorial campaign that at one point I was sure 
I’d lose and seriously considered dropping out. 
BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 62, at xiii. 
 134. Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 7 (citing retributive theory of justice as a factor in 
clemency’s decline). 
 135. See Death Row Clemency Is Much Rarer These Days, supra note 131. 
 136. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan granted the largest blanket clemency in history 
when he commuted the sentences of 167 death row inmates as one of his last acts in office. See 
Illinois Governor’s Blanket Pardon Spares Lives of 167 Condemned Inmates, FOX NEWS (Jan. 11 
2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,75170,00.html (stating that Governor Ryan granted 
167 clemency petitions two days before the end of his gubernatorial term). 
 137. AM. BAR ASS’N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99, at 69. 
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the majority of the California Supreme Court must concur.138 
However, no similar requirement exists for a Governor to deny 
clemency to a two-time felon.139 Thus, the legislature was more 
concerned with harnessing the governor’s power to grant clemency 
than his or her ability to deny it.140 This further pressures California 
governors to deny clemency.141 
V.  CALIFORNIA NEEDS A CLEMENCY PROCESS THAT 
ALLOWS FOR MEANINGFUL, RELIABLE REVIEW 
The number of individuals sentenced to death has steadily 
increased over the past forty years.142 California has the largest death 
row in the country, with over 700 inmates awaiting execution.143 As 
the death sentences increase, so does the potential for wrongful 
convictions.144 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996145 augments this problem. The statute restricts inmates’ 
habeas corpus review by imposing a one-year statute of limitations 
and requiring a deferential standard of review for assessing inmates’ 
claims.146 As a result, inmates bringing constitutional challenges 
against their sentences are severely limited in their ability to find 
relief through habeas corpus avenues. Therefore, clemency may be 
some inmates’ only chance for post-conviction relief. 
Interestingly, as death sentences have increased, clemency 
 
 138. CAL CONST. art. V, § 8. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 96. 
 141. Governor Edmund Brown faced this pressure when deciding clemency for Caryl 
Chessman. Governor Brown considered granting clemency, but a grant required affirmation by 
the California Supreme Court because Chessman had two prior felonies. BROWN WITH ADLER, 
supra note 62, at 35. After speaking with one of the justices, Brown learned that the court would 
not affirm clemency if he granted the petition. Id. Therefore, granting clemency was not worth the 
“extremely dangerous” political backlash Brown expected because the supreme court would 
strike down the decision anyway. Id. at 34. 
 142. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2011) (showing an increase in death row populations per year, until 2001). 
 143. See id. 
 144. Lim, supra note 16, at 67. 
 145. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261–2266 (2006)). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006) (“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State 
court shall be presumed to be correct.”); id. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall 
apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”). 
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grants have steadily declined.147 A California governor has not 
granted clemency since 1967,148 yet death row inmates continue to 
seek clemency. As the increasing death row population turns to 
clemency for post-conviction relief, the procedures used for 
determining whether to grant clemency petitions should fall under 
closer scrutiny.149 However, many scholars have questioned 
clemency’s ability to function in a meaningful way.150 When 
speaking to the House of Representatives, Douglas A. Berman, a law 
professor at Ohio State University, stated, “Unfortunately, in modern 
times, the ‘fail safe’ of executive clemency has been failing to 
effectively serve the ends of justice that the Framers emphasized.”151 
The days of clemency as a regularly used function have passed—in 
order to remain a relevant and meaningful instrument, California’s 
clemency process must evolve and follow the example of other states 
that have implemented more structured systems.152 
 
 147. Gershowitz, supra note 49, at 670–71 (2001) (“Given the Court’s hands-off approach 
and the more frequent use of capital punishment, executive clemency takes on even greater 
importance. In short, clemency truly does have the potential to be the fail safe of the criminal 
justice system. Unfortunately, however, that potential has not been realized. In fact, the use of 
executive clemency has dramatically declined in the past few decades.”). 
 148. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 156. 
 149. Lim, supra note 16, at 47, 66. 
 150. See Gershowitz, supra note 49, at 700–01. 
 151. Presidential Clemency Power: Testimony before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Douglas A. Berman, Professor of Law, Ohio State University). 
 152. See supra Part II.B. There is also a possible conflict between the California Penal Code 
and the state constitution. The constitution bestows broad discretionary powers on the governor 
and only requires approval from the majority of the supreme court to grant clemency to a two-
time felon. The Penal Code, however, requires that the governor transmit certain clemency 
petitions to the BHP. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 56 n.99; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 
83, at 156–57. This Note advocates solving this apparent discrepancy when enacting 
constitutional amendments to California’s clemency provisions. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATION 
As Justice Kennedy has stated, “[T]he clemency power can 
correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or 
unwilling to consider.”153 To restore this purpose of clemency, 
California must implement procedural guidelines for approaching 
clemency petitions and create a board to decide petitions’ outcomes. 
Enacting a clemency board and standard clemency procedures will 
help correct the rampant problems in California’s current system, 
including the political pressure on the governor, the lack of 
transparency in decisionmaking, and the apparent arbitrariness or 
unfairness of decisions. By making these changes, California will 
create a dependable, fair clemency system that meaningfully and 
efficiently protects against injustice. 
A.  A Board Should Decide Clemency 
A decisionmaking board is necessary to alleviate the political 
pressures that presently cramp California’s clemency system. The 
Moratorium Project recognized the political pressure weighing on 
decisionmakers and recommended insulating clemency decisions 
from such pressure as much as possible.154 Appointing a board to 
make clemency decisions instead of placing the responsibility with a 
single popularly elected individual will promote the political 
insulation the Moratorium Project recommended. Even scholars who 
support discretionary executive power recognize that placing 
clemency decisions with a board would remove the significant 
political pressure that the governor currently faces.155 
There are several ways to select a clemency board—some 
scholars have suggested that boards include the sentencing judge156 or 
 
 153. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 154. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 90. 
 155. Id. at 96 (“There is nothing, in place in California, however, that attempts to remove 
some of the political pressure on an elected official, such as by putting a determinative decision 
into the hands of an independent board.”). Even though clemency has traditionally rested with a 
single executive, several states have broken tradition and created clemency boards. See Clemency, 
supra note 32. Furthermore, early American citizens, distrustful of arbitrary or biased rulings, 
were hesitant to grant broad, unrestricted powers to a single executive. See Harris & Redmond, 
supra note 10, at 3. In its current form, California’s dysfunctional clemency system appears to 
warrant this distrust. 
 156. See generally Huang, supra note 17, at 131 (suggesting a judge to sit on a board deciding 
federal clemency). 
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the governor. Others would allow the governor to appoint clemency 
board members.157 However, the key goal when selecting the 
clemency board is to ensure its members are not “political 
appointments” who are subjected to political pressures.158 With this 
in mind, Victoria Palacios, a former member of a parole board, has 
suggested that the governor select members for an appointments 
board that, in turn, would choose the clemency board members.159 
At the most basic level, using a clemency board will make 
clemency decisions appear less arbitrary and more objective. Using a 
more structured approach and placing decisions in the hands of 
multiple individuals will make the decision appear less subject to 
whim or personal bias. Furthermore, a board may revitalize 
California’s stagnant clemency process. The Kennedy Commission 
found that 
pardons tend to be granted more regularly and generously 
in the five states where the pardon power is exercised by an 
independent board with no involvement by the governor, 
than it is in the twenty-two states where the governor 
exercises the power subject to no procedural constraints.160 
Though the Commission reviewed the clemency system broadly, this 
finding may translate to capital cases as well—of the six states that 
use a board to decide clemency,161 three states grant clemencies fairly 
regularly.162 
 
 157. This approach is problematic because board members appointed by the governor are 
politically aligned and are therefore subject to political pressure. For a clemency board to ensure a 
fair, meaningful review, the decisionmaker(s) must be insulated from this pressure. 
 158. Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in the Fantasy: The Supreme Court’s Reliance on 
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 352–53 (1996). 
 159. Id. at 371. 
 160. AM. BAR ASS’N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99, at 70. This statistic is based 
on the entire clemency system, not solely capital cases. 
 161. Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, and Utah. Clemency, supra note 32; see 
State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO.RMATION CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
state_by_state (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (select Idaho, Nebraska, and Nevada from drop-down 
options to view state clemency models). 
 162. Since 1976, Georgia has granted seven clemencies and executed fifty-one people; 
Nevada has granted one clemency and executed twelve people; and Idaho has granted one 
clemency and executed one person. State by State Database, supra note 161. 
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B.  Procedural Guidelines Should Be Enacted 
Some scholars maintain that clemency is an executive function 
and should therefore remain discretionary and largely unregulated.163 
However, California’s current clemency system undermines this 
proposition. In California, the clemency system is not strictly an 
executive function—the California Supreme Court must confirm the 
governor’s decision to grant clemency to a twice-convicted felon.164 
Furthermore, clemency’s stagnancy suggests that it may no longer 
protect against miscarriages of justice.165 With the emergence of the 
retributive theory of justice, the number of death row sentences 
continues to increase, while meaningful clemency review seems to 
decrease.166 In light of the changes in capital punishment,167 the 
justifications for the “unfettered discretion of the executive have lost 
their potency.”168 Thus, more procedural standards should be enacted 
to ensure clemency still functions as a fail safe for injustice.169 
Many scholars and the ABA support implementing standard 
clemency procedures.170 The ABA Moratorium Project made eleven 
recommendations to bolster state clemency processes, including 
substantive standards, public hearings, and individual meetings with 
the decisionmaker.171 Though some petitions may have received this 
 
 163. See generally Harris & Redmond, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing California’s state 
clemency process); Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 96–97 (discussing clemency in California 
capital cases). 
 164. CAL. CONST. art V, § 8. 
 165. See Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1838. 
 166. See generally Dinsmore, supra note 4 (discussing the need to ensure meaningful review 
in California capital cases). 
 167. The criminal justice system used to impose harsh mandatory sentencing, in which 
punishments were not closely tailored to crimes. Id. at 1833–34.Under this system, unregulated, 
broad clemency powers allowed executives to tailor sentences and ensure individual 
consideration. Id. However, since then, sentencing has become more flexible with the subdivision 
of murder into degrees and the U.S. Supreme Court’s requirement that the states redraft precise 
penal codes. Id. Therefore, considering the evolution of capital punishment, unregulated, 
discretionary clemency powers are no longer necessary. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1834. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See generally, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N. JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99, at 70 
(examining the fairness, wisdom, and efficacy of criminal punishment throughout the United 
States); Dinsmore supra note 4 (discussing the need to ensure meaningful review in California 
capital cases); ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Project, supra note 100 (assessing the fairness 
and accuracy of eight state death penalty systems). 
 171. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 90. 
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treatment, these procedures are not required or regularly followed in 
California.172 Recognizing this inconsistency in states like California, 
the ABA Kennedy Commission stated: 
Jurisdictions should also make clear the standards that 
govern applications for commutation and pardon; specify 
the procedures that an individual must follow in order to 
qualify for a grant of clemency; and ensure that clemency 
procedures are reasonably accessible to all persons.173 
This Note supports the recommendations of the Moratorium 
Project and Kennedy Commission and advocates the creation of 
basic procedural standards for the proposed clemency board to 
follow in deciding petitions.174 
Because California has enacted statutory provisions related to 
the appointment of counsel and resources,175 this Note focuses on 
what procedures should take place once the decisionmaker becomes 
involved in the petition. First, to ensure a complete and consistent 
review, the legislature should clearly articulate the types of 
information the board should consider, such as records of mental 
health, economic disparity, and any doubt of guilt. In this way, the 
clemency board may ensure its review is as thorough as possible and 
petitioners will know the types of factors the board will consider. 
These factors may serve as guidelines that guarantee the 
decisionmaker considers basic important information when deciding 
clemency but will allow for further investigation should the board so 
choose.176 In this way, these substantive standards promote 
transparency and consistency, yet allow the board to consider exigent 
circumstances and exercise mercy.177 
Second, after an appropriate investigation has taken place,178 the 
 
 172. Id. at 92 (listing clemency procedures that are not regularly followed in California). 
 173. AM. BAR ASS’N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, supra note 99, at 74. 
 174. If a clemency board is not created, these suggested procedures apply equally to the 
governor. 
 175. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 91–92. 
 176. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1855 (explaining that substantive procedures can function as 
guiding principles rather than constraints). 
 177. Id. at 1855–56. 
 178. The BPH may continue to conduct clemency investigations for the decisionmaker. These 
investigations will differ in their mandatory character and inclusion of the aforementioned 
minimally required areas of research. 
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board should hold a public hearing.179 Requiring this type of hearing 
provides both the petitioner and opposing counsel an opportunity to 
be heard and present any important information to the 
decisionmaker. Additionally, holding a public hearing will open the 
clemency process to the community, thereby providing further 
transparency in the clemency process and ensuring interested parties 
are able to attend. 
Finally, similar to Georgia, a state that delegates clemency 
powers to a board,180 California should require the board to submit 
written reports of clemency denials to the legislature. Reporting these 
denials to the legislature will create a public record of clemency 
denials, not just grants, thereby “creat[ing] a more complete database 
for future governors, legislators, researchers, and the general 
public.”181 This type of public access will allow for more 
transparency in the clemency system and create a historical record 
for future decision-makers to refer to.182 
VII.  WHY THE TIME IS RIGHT TO EFFECT CHANGE—CAPITAL 
CLEMENCY’S INEXTRICABLE TIES TO THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE 
The time to effect change is now. Given the political climate 
surrounding the death penalty183 and the growing budget crisis,184 
 
 179. Under California’s current system, even if the BHP holds a public hearing, it does not 
take place before the governor. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 92. 
 180. See GA. CODE ANN. §42–9-43(a) (1997). Georgia requires its clemency board to submit 
written reports of its activities to the governor, the attorney general, and all the members of the 
general assembly each year. 
 181. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 97. 
 182. Id. at 99–100. 
 183. Public and political outcry over California’s death penalty has come from several 
different corners, regardless of title or political affiliation. Judge Arthur L. Alarcón of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a former district attorney and clemency secretary, deemed 
California’s death penalty system “defunct.” Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing 
the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-
Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S42, S46 (2011). The 
American Law Institute, which originally drafted the death penalty structure, does not support the 
current system it created, yet refuses to rework it. In 2009, police considered the death penalty the 
least effective method of preventing crime. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Aug. 11, 
2011). 
 184. See generally Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 181 (examining California’s capital 
punishment system and the costs of administering the death penalty). In the midst of a hefty 
budget deficit, California spends millions annually on funding the death penalty. 
The costs of expensive death penalty trials are the tip of the iceberg; the exorbitant bills 
to the taxpayers begin to stack up in earnest after a death sentence is imposed. At that 
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California is poised to reform its criminal justice system, particularly 
in the capital arena. Part of this reform must be revitalizing the 
capital clemency system. The clemency process is inextricably tied 
to the death penalty, as it is a death row inmate’s final option for 
avoiding execution by a faltering criminal system. In their recent 
critique of California’s death penalty system, Judge Arthur L. 
Alarcón of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a former 
clemency secretary to the governor, and Paula M. Mitchell, an 
adjunct law professor, expressed their dissatisfaction with 
California’s failure to implement the recommendations of the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice.185 This 
commission conducted a study of California’s criminal justice 
system—capital punishment in particular—and recommended 
significant changes to the system.186 As noted above, these 
recommendations included amendments to the clemency system that 
would promote further transparency and fair reviews.187 Judge 
Alarcón and Paula Mitchell highlighted the legislature’s failure to 
enact these recommendations in 2008—specifically those providing 
the timely appointment of counsel and review for condemned 
inmates—and called for voter action in favor of capital reform.188 In 
response to Judge Alarcón and Paula Mitchell’s report, Senator Levi 
Hancock introduced Senate Bill 490, which seeks to abolish 
California’s death penalty.189 The bill, which has passed through the 
Public Safety Committee, must survive the Appropriations 
Committee, the Assembly and Senate floor, and the governor’s 
 
point, California taxpayers foot the $186 million annual bill for housing, healthcare, 
and the provision of legal representation for condemned inmates, many of whom are 
dying of natural causes. 
Id. at S46. 
 185. Id. at S47–48. 
 186. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 10–21. 
 187. These clemency recommendations are not entirely on point with the viewpoint of this 
Note, as the commission supports maintaining broad executive clemency powers. However, the 
commission does recommend creating public records of clemency denials and conducting a 
meeting between the governor and both parties to the petition, among other recommendations. Id. 
at 156–57. 
 188. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 181, at S47, n.7. 
 189. Courtney Minick, California Voters May Get Chance to Weigh In on Death Penalty, 
JUSTIA LAW, TECH. & LEGAL MARKETING BLOG (July 18, 2011), 
http://onward.justia.com/2011/07/18/california-voters-may-get-chance-to-weigh-in-on-death-
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scrutiny before it is placed on California’s 2012 voters’ ballot.190 
Considering the tumultuous debates surrounding the death 
penalty and the legislature’s past failure to enact reform, it is natural 
to question whether California’s legislature will have the courage to 
act upon the recommendations of this Note—it is fair to assume that 
the political pressure to deny clemency petitions equally applies to 
the legislature and the amendments it enacts, especially those related 
to the death penalty. However, the legislature should not be fearful of 
creating both a clemency board and procedural standards for it to 
follow, as doing so is favorable to both proponents and opponents of 
the death penalty. In this way, clemency reform sidesteps the 
political ramifications of enacting death penalty reform. 
Death penalty opponents will support enacting a these clemency 
amendments because they provide a meaningful review of an 
inmate’s case and, in turn, further protect against executing innocent 
people. Also, consistently requiring the decisionmaker to consider 
socioeconomic, mental health, and family history information when 
deciding clemency may alleviate unfortunate sentencing biases191 in 
the judicial system. 
Death penalty proponents should also support the recommended 
clemency approach. Providing a meaningful review of an inmate’s 
case ensures that retribution is exacted on the correct individual. This 
makes the argument for the death penalty stronger—if additional 
steps are taken to guarantee innocent people are not executed, a key 
argument against the death penalty is effectively eliminated. 
Furthermore, the proposed clemency approach is consistent with 
victim and family rights. Requiring a public hearing before the 
clemency board gives the victim’s family, in addition to the 
petitioner, a greater chance to be heard. This is important, for in 
some cases, victims’ family members do not support execution and 
instead favor granting clemency.192 
Therefore, because enacting a clemency board and procedural 
requirements to govern it is favorable to both sides of the death 
penalty debate, the legislature should embrace the recommendations 
of this Note. Though clemency bills have been unsuccessful in the 
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 191. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83 at 169–71 (discussing racial and socioeconomic 
sentencing disparities). 
 192. Moylan & Carter, supra note 36, at 76. 
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past,193 given the current dissatisfaction with California’s capital 
punishment system and the repeated calls for legislative action, the 
time is right to effect change in our clemency system. In fact, by 
enacting the recommended clemency amendments, the legislature 
may be able to appease, albeit temporarily, members of the public 
who are dissatisfied with the legislature’s failure to act on issues 
raised by the death penalty debate.194 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
California must end the lack of transparency, apparent 
arbitrariness, and political pressure that render its clemency system 
an empty, meaningless ritual. For California’s clemency system to 
properly safeguard against miscarriages of justice, the state must 
create a board to decide clemency petitions and provide procedural 
standards for the board to follow. True, making these changes will 
take time and cost money, but “society should be willing to pay the 
price” to ensure sentences are rightfully determined.195 By adopting a 
clemency board and procedural standards, the state will reinstate 
clemency’s fail-safe function, ensure that petitions receive a 
meaningful review, and restore clemency to its rightful active 
position in the criminal justice system. 
 
 193. Senate Bill 119, proposed in 2006, called for mandatory hearing before the BPH, the 
appointment of competent counsel, and other related fiscal and timing requirements. Alarcón & 
Mitchell, supra note 181, at S200. 
 194. Judge Alarcón and Paula Mitchell refer to the legislature’s failure to address the state’s 
deteriorating death penalty system as a “multi-billion-dollar fraud.” Id. at S46. 
 195. Dinsmore, supra note 4, at 1858 (stating that clemency is the last stage to catch errors of 
the judicial system and increasing clemency costs is worth ensuring that innocent people are not 
executed). 
